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Introduction

S

ince the Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force in 2005, attention has focused on the question of what to do after 2012,
when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends.
Should the Kyoto Protocol be extended through the
adoption of a second commitment period, with a new round of
emission reduction targets for developed country parties?
And, if so, should a new agreement be adopted under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),1
which addresses the emissions of countries that either are not parties to the Kyoto Protocol2 (the United States) or do not have Kyoto
emissions targets (developing countries)? Or should a single new
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agreement be adopted that replaces the Kyoto Protocol and is more
comprehensive in coverage, addressing both developed and developing country emissions?
The Copenhagen Conference of the Parties (COP), which met
from December 7 to 19, 2009, had been intended as the deadline to
resolve these questions about the post-2012 climate regime – a view
reflected in the unofficial slogan for the conference, “seal the deal.”3
The decision by more than 100 heads of state or government
to attend heightened public expectations that the Copenhagen
Conference would result in a major breakthrough; and more than
40,000 people registered, making Copenhagen one of the largest
environmental meetings in history.
But the lack of progress in the negotiations in the months leading up to Copenhagen suggested that hopes for a full-fledged legal
agreement were unrealistic.
In the end, the Copenhagen Conference resulted only in a political agreement, the Copenhagen Accord,4 which was negotiated by
the leaders of the world’s major economies, but was not formally
adopted by the conference, leaving its future prospects uncertain.
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The Copenhagen Accord is a political
rather than a legal document … and may well represent the
high-water mark of the climate change regime for some time to come.

The Copenhagen Accord

The Copenhagen Accord is a political rather than a legal document, negotiated by a group of about 25 heads of state, heads of
government, ministers and other heads of delegations.
Key elements of the accord include the following:

Long-term vision

The Copenhagen Accord recognizes the need to limit global
temperature increase to no more than 2 degrees Celsius.
States were unable to agree on other methods of defining the
regime’s long-term objective, for example, in terms of an upper
bound on atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases such as
350 or 450 parts per million (ppm), or a long-term goal to reduce
global emissions by 50 percent by 2050 (the so-called “50 by 50”
target, which the G-8 has endorsed), or a target date for the peaking
of global emissions.
In deference to the small island states, which had pushed for a
1.5 degree limit on global temperature change, the Copenhagen
Accord provides that the assessment of the accord by 2015 include
consideration of this stronger target.

Developed country mitigation

Over the past year, general consensus has emerged that developed countries should undertake economy-wide emissions reduction targets for the post-2012 period, although countries have
differed about the stringency of these emissions reduction targets,
the base-year from which reduction targets should be measured and
whether the targets should be defined using international accounting rules (as in Kyoto) or national legislation (as the United States
has proposed).
The Copenhagen Accord establishes a bottom-up process that
allows each developed country party to define its own target level,
base year and accounting rules, and to submit its target in a defined
format, for compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat. Under the
terms of the accord, Annex I countries “commit to implement” their
targets, individually or jointly, subject to international monitoring,
reporting and verification (MRV).

Developing country mitigation

As with developed country emissions targets, the Copenhagen
Accord establishes a bottom-up process by which developing countries will submit their mitigation actions in a defined format for
compilation by the UNFCCC Secretariat.
It provides that developing countries will submit greenhouse
gas inventories every two years, that developing country mitigation
actions will be subject to domestic MRV and that the results of
this domestic MRV will be reported in biennial national commu-
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nications, which will be subject to “international consultations and
analysis under clearly defined guidelines.”
The Copenhagen Accord also establishes a registry for listing
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) for which international support is sought and provides that supported NAMAs
will be subject to international MRV in accordance with COP
guidelines.

Financial assistance

In Copenhagen, the discussions about financial support revolved
around the typical issues: how much money, from what sources and
with what governance arrangements?
The Copenhagen Accord addresses only the first of these issues,
leaving the other two for future resolution.
It creates a “collective commitment” for developed countries to
provide “new and additional resources . . . approaching $30 billion”
for the 2010-2012 period, balanced between adaptation and mitigation, and sets a longer-term collective “goal” of mobilizing $100
billion per year by 2020 from all sources, but links this money to
“meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation.”
It also calls for governance of adaptation funding through equal
representation by developing and developed country parties but
does not establish the governance arrangement for finance more
generally.
Finally, it calls for the establishment of a Copenhagen Green
Climate Fund as an operating entity of the UNFCCC’s financial
mechanism as well as a high level panel to consider potential sources
of revenue to meet the $100 billion per year goal.

Forestry

In the run-up to Copenhagen, the potential to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (known as
“REDD-plus”) received considerable attention. The principal
question has been whether to finance REDD-plus from public
funds or by providing carbon credits.
The Copenhagen Accord calls for the “immediate establishment” of a mechanism to help mobilize resources for REDD-plus
from developed countries and acknowledges the “need to provide
positive incentives,” without resolving the issue of public vs. private
support.

Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)

As with the mitigation issue, the MRV discussions have concerned the level of MRV as well as the parallelism/differentiation
between developed and developing country MRV.
The Copenhagen Accord calls for “rigorous, robust and transpar2010 Advocate
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ent” MRV of Annex I emissions reductions and financing, “in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the COP.”
As noted earlier, supported NAMAs by developing countries will
be subject to international MRV “in accordance with guidelines
adopted by the COP,” while so-called “autonomous” mitigation
actions will be verified nationally and reported in national communications every two years and subject to “international consultations
and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that
national sovereignty is respected.”

The Future of the Copenhagen Accord

Despite agreement on the Copenhagen Accord by the heads of
state or government of more than 25 countries, including all of the
major economies, the conference was unable to “adopt” the accord
due to objections by a small group of countries, led by Sudan,
Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua, which refused to join consensus, arguing that the negotiation of the Copenhagen Accord by a
smaller group represented a “coup d’état” against the United Nations
because it bypassed the formal meetings.
After an all-night session, the impasse was ultimately broken
through a decision to “take note of” the Copenhagen Accord, giving
it some status in the UNFCCC process but not as much as approval
by the COP.
Those countries that wish to “associate” themselves with the
Copenhagen Accord are to notify the UNFCCC Secretariat for
inclusion in the list of countries at the beginning of the accord.
As of February 10, 2010, the UNFCCC Secretariat had received
submissions from more than 90 countries, representing more than
80 percent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, regarding
their plans to reduce their GHG emissions and/or their wish to be
“associated” with the Copenhagen Accord.
In most cases, countries providing information on their mitigation actions have expressly “associated” themselves with the
Copenhagen Accord.
The Copenhagen Accord asserts that it will be “operational
immediately,” but fully operationalizing its terms will require further
acts – for example, the spelling out of the guidelines for international consultation and analysis of developing country mitigation
actions and the establishment of the various bodies envisioned in
the accord (a high level panel to study potential sources of revenue,
the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund and a new technology mechanism).
Ordinarily, this work would be carried out by the COP. But if
some countries continue to block consensus in the COP, as occurred
in Copenhagen, then this elaboration of the Copenhagen Accord
might need to be done by the “associators” group.

Conclusion

Although the Copenhagen Accord has been criticized by some
as inadequate, it represents a potentially significant breakthrough.
True, the emission reduction pledges announced thus far do not
put the world on a pathway to limiting climate change to 2 degrees
Celsius, the ostensible long-term goal of the accord.5
But the participating states did agree to list their national actions
internationally and to subject their actions to some form of inter-
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national scrutiny, even when their actions do not receive any international support.
Plus, the accord articulates a quantified long-term goal for the
first time (no more than 2 degree Celsius temperature increase)
and puts significant new funds on the table, both for the short and
medium terms.
As a political necessity, the Copenhagen Accord continues to
reflect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities, but in a very different manner than in
Kyoto.
Developed countries committed to implement economy-wide
emission reduction “targets,” subject to international MRV, while
developing country “actions” will be subject to international MRV
only if they receive international support and to national MRV
otherwise.
Nevertheless, the Copenhagen Accord reflects an apparent shift
by China, India, Brazil and South Africa, which begins to break the
so-called “firewall” between developed and developing countries.
For the first time, major developing countries have agreed to
reflect their national emission reduction pledges in an international
instrument, to report on their GHG inventories and their mitigation actions in biennial national communications and to subject
their actions either to MRV (for internationally supported actions)
or “international consultation and analysis under clearly defined
guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected” (for
domestically supported actions).
This outcome may seem like a rather modest achievement, but
it represents some measure of “internationalization” of developing
country actions.
In any event, if world leaders could not agree to more through
direct negotiations, under an intense international spotlight, it is
hard to see why mid-level negotiators will be able to achieve more
anytime soon.
As a result, the Copenhagen Accord may well represent the highwater mark of the climate change regime for some time to come.
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